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RETHINKING FORUM SHOPPING IN CYBERSPACE
KIMBERLY A. MOORE* AND FRANCESCO PARISI**
INTRODUCTION
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg's 2001 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters ad-
dresses jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments in the area
of intellectual property.' The proposal follows, in many aspects, the
text of the Hague Conference's 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters.2 The authors of the former proposal perceive that a special con-
vention on intellectual property disputes would be particularly
advantageous, not only in light of the uncertain prospects of the
Hague Convention, but also for the peculiar problems emerging in
the adjudication and recognition of foreign judgments in the field of
intellectual property:
[A] convention drafted for intellectual property disputes can take
account of issues uniquely raised by the intangibility of the rights in
issue. For example, where a general convention's jurisdiction pro-
visions speak generally of "acts," "omissions," and their foresee-
ability, an instrument on intellectual property disputes can be
geared specifically to the events that comprise infringement.3
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason School of Law.
** Professor of Law, George Mason School of Law and Co-director, J.M. Buchanan
Center for Political Economy, Program in Economics and the Law.
1. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002).
2. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html [hereinafter Hague Conference].
3. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1066. Some commentators suggest that, unlike
real property claims, intellectual property claims raise unique and difficult jurisdictional issues
due to the intangible nature of the property and should be dealt with in a separate, standalone
treaty. See, e.g., Final Resolution on the Envisaged Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, AIPPI Res. 153, (Mar. 30, 2001), at
www.aippi.org (suggesting that intellectual property matters be excluded from the substantive
scope of the Hague Convention because of a lack of international consensus on how to handle
such matters); The Hon. Mr. Justice Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in the
Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 507, 516 (2000) (suggesting that the Hague
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Dreyfuss and Ginsburg note that the problems posed by the new
cyberworld realities can hardly be addressed with the traditional tools
of analysis. Indeed, in many respects, the modern communication
methods in cyberspace make it increasingly likely that infringement
of intangible rights that give rise to an intellectual property case may
have multiple relevant points of contact with different jurisdictions,
exacerbating the traditional conflict of laws problems and putting to
the test most of the frameworks of private international law adjudica-
tion.
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg identify efficiency in international intel-
lectual property disputes as one of the primary targets of their draft
convention. An important component of the proposal is indeed
found in the objective to conserve judicial resources on an interna-
tional basis and promote consistent outcomes. Very interestingly, the
drafters observe:
Where a general convention may be concerned with curtailing fo-
rum shopping by potential plaintiffs, an intellectual property
agreement can also consider the ability of a potential defendant to
gain litigation advantages through the choice of the location of the
activities that give rise to infringement. In certain situations, the
propriety of expanding jurisdiction depends on the possibility of in-
consistent outcomes; a convention tailored to intellectual property
can specify what that term means in the context of public goods.4
Convention eliminate intellectual property from its purview and leave the nation-state litigation
systems in place).
In response to a US Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO") request for comments on
the Hague Convention, several respondents advocated eliminating intellectual property from
the Hague Convention. See Letter from Dr. Peter T. DiMauro, Patent Agent, International
Center for Technology Assessment, to Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, Director/Commissioner,
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Jan. 12, 2001) (at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices
/pac/dapp/opla/comments/index.html); Letter from Steven L. Hensen, President, Society of
American Archivists, to Velica Steadman, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office
(Oct. 17, 2001) (available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/haguecomments
/index.html) (recommending eliminating copyright claims from the Hague Convention); Letter
from Laura A. Kaster, General Attorney in Charge of IP Litigation, AT&T Corp. (undated) (at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/haguecomments/index.html); Letter from Doris
Estelle Long, Professor, John Marshall Law School, to Velica Steadman, Director, United
States Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 19, 2001) (at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/
olia/haguecomments/index.html) (recommending the creation of a separate treaty to deal with
international jurisdiction issues relating to intellectual property claims); Letter from Frederick
W. Weingarten, Director, American Library Association Office for Information Technology
Policy & Miriam M. Nisbet, Legislative Counsel, American Library Association Office of
Government Relations, to Nicholas P. Godici, Acting Director, United States Patent and
Trademark Office (Oct. 17, 2001) (at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/hague
comments/index.html) (reporting a resolution adopted by the American Library Association
which urges the negotiators at the Hague Convention to remove intellectual property cases
from the scope of the Convention).
4. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1066.
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This Article will concentrate on the specific issue of forum shop-
ping in the context of intellectual property.
I. FORUM SHOPPING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE'
Modern conflicts of law systems treat jurisdictional and choice of
law issues differently. 6 Procedural rules generally determine adjudi-
catory jurisdiction,7 whereas different criteria determine choice of
applicable law.' The differing approaches are the product of the his-
torical evolution of conflict of laws.9 The Hague Convention on Ju-
risdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
and the Dreyfuss and Ginsburg proposal are no exception to such
tradition.
As a matter of historical speculation, conflict of law systems
could have developed a single set of rules to solve both jurisdictional
and substantive issues. In such a hypothetical world, the choice of
applicable law could have been linked to the adjudicatory jurisdiction
of the court and the jurisdiction most closely connected to a case
would have decided the case. Courts never would have applied for-
eign law. But historically and dogmatically, this solution was not vi-
able.
First, without perfect coordination among national conflict of law
rules, parties could be left without a forum for their dispute. For ex-
ample, system A could deny jurisdiction for a case because, according
to the conflict of law criteria of system A, it is more closely connected
to system B. However, once filed in jurisdiction B, the jurisdiction
might also deny jurisdiction because, according to the conflict of law
criteria in system B, the situation is regarded as more closely con-
nected to system A.
Second, national judges were historically wary of dismissing cases
that had some connection with their legal system. And legislators
5. For a more detailed historical perspective see Francesco Parisi & Erin A. O'Hara,
Conflicts of Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 387-
96 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
6. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 280 (1983).
7. See generally Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (1984) (comparing interstate
and supranational approaches to judicial jurisdiction and concluding that the problems posed by
federalism call for similar approaches by both the European Community and US).
8. See generally Francesco Parisi & Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 236-41.
9. See Friedrich K. Juenger, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 6-46 (1993).
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found it politically more acceptable to allow the application of foreign
rules when domestic judges applied and interpreted such rules.
Linking jurisdiction and choice of law would have released any resid-
ual sovereign control over a case. Such an unconditional surrender
would have been at odds with the still evolving concept of jurisdic-
tional sovereignty. Thus, the historical concurrence of pragmatic and
dogmatic considerations led to the evolution of a dual system of con-
flict of laws.
Unavoidably, the dualistic approach generates the potential for
conflicts between the jurisdictional claims of national courts. Where
two or more jurisdictions are able to hear a dispute, a plaintiff can
"forum shop," or choose among alternative fora, often with an oppor-
tunity to preempt a defendant's choice.
A. Overlapping Jurisdictions and the Problem of Forum Shopping
Where adjudicatory jurisdictions do overlap, the case will likely
be decided in the jurisdiction where it is first filed. By strategically
choosing the forum, a plaintiff can maximize the expected return from
litigation.
The strategic choice of forum has distributional effects and effi-
ciency implications. Inasmuch as the status of plaintiff is randomly
determined, the distributional effects have no ex ante impact on indi-
vidual incentives. However, if some individuals are statistically more
likely to be plaintiffs than defendants, such as property rights holders
(copyright owner, patentee, or trademark owner), the opportunity for
forum shopping may have biased distributional effects with a poten-
tial impact on the ex ante incentives of the parties. In contrast, the ex
post efficiency implications are independent of the random nature of
the status of plaintiff. The plaintiff's advantage will trigger a "race to
the courthouse," inducing potential defendants to expedite their filing
in order to preempt the opponent's choice of jurisdiction. The "race
to the courthouse" may thus have substantial efficiency implications,
accelerating the filing process and bringing to trial cases that may not
have matured into court claims had they been left to the choice of the
natural plaintiff.
In this setting, the ex post choice of forum produces results that
are quite different from the ex ante contractual choice of law and fo-
rum. Ex ante agreements, if enforced without exceptions, enhance
predictability by allowing the parties to choose among several com-
peting laws and jurisdictions. By contrast, ex post choice of forum
[Vol. 77:1325
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generates unpredictability in the system. Furthermore, with ex ante
choice of law, parties can select more efficient rules to govern their
contractual relationship. Conversely, the ex post choice of forum is
strategically determined, and the equilibrium solution of a forum
shopping game is not likely to produce the most efficient choice of
law and jurisdiction.
Continental ideals of multilateralism and certainty in the conflict
of law process embody the above concerns. Ex ante predictability is
set out as a primary goal of the conflict of law system, at least in those
cases where forum shopping may result in the application of different
substantive laws.
B. Uniform Outcomes, Multilateralism, and Mirror-Image Tests
The traditional civil law desire for coherence, certainty, and de-
ductive logic spawned the European rule-based approach for conflict
of laws resolution.I0 Bright-line tests are preferred to multi-factor
analysis because of the greater predictability of their results." Rarely
do European conflict rules allow for standard-based methodologies
similar to those used in the United States. The difference in ap-
proaches and the traditional European hostility for open-ended
methodologies is best signified by the emphasis in European scholar-
ship on the primary goal of conflict of laws: uniform outcomes for
similar cases.12 Any given case that requires the application of con-
flict of law rules should be decided according to the same substantive
rules in all jurisdictions. A double solution is disfavored for any given
case.
The traditional consensus favoring a rule-based approach can be
traced back to the work of the German scholar Friedrich Carl von
Savigny (1779-1861). He advocated with great theoretical clarity
that the primary objectives of conflict of law rules ought to be uni-
formity of outcomes and discouragement of forum shopping.14 Con-
sequently, Savigny developed a system of rules, grouping hypothetical
10. See Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do You Rate a Century?, 37 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 89,
93 (2001).
11. MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH
THE JUNGLE, 9-11 (1995).
12. Europeans label this goal "decisional harmony." Juenger, supra note 10, at 93 n.32.
13. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE
LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN PLACE AND TIME (William Guthrie trans., T&T Clark 2d ed.
1880) (1849).
14. See Juenger, supra note 9, at 39.
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cases into thirty-nine categories and contemplating an equal number
of connecting factors to determine applicable law. Savigny's ap-
proach is noteworthy for having fully articulated a case for rules and
multilateralism, breaking apart from for forum-centered solutions. 5
Modern European models of multilateralism in conflict of laws
reflect Savigny's ideal of uniform outcomes. 6 Multilateralists are
critical of the forum-centered methodology of interest analysis and
expect courts to consider the likely result of the case if it were submit-
ted to a foreign court.17 In its purest form, multilateralism requires
courts to perform a hypothetical mirror-image test, asking if their so-
lution would be compatible with a symmetrical claim litigated in an-
other jurisdiction.
Several conflict of law approaches fail to satisfy the requirements
of multilateralism. For example, a forum law approach performs
poorly under the mirror-image test. If jurisdiction A claims that all
disputes shall be resolved by application of its law, A's claim is in-
compatible with any other jurisdiction's symmetrical claim to regulate
the dispute according to its forum law. Similarly, standard-based ap-
proaches and multi-factor analyses also tend to score poorly under
the mirror image test.
By contrast, bright-line criteria and rule-based approaches are
generally more compatible with a multilateral approach to conflicts
resolution. For example, connecting factors based on unambiguous
criteria such as the place of the accident, or the residence of the de
cuius are fully compatible with the multilateral approach. Simply
stated, no interjurisdictional conflict would emerge under multilateral
rules. Unfortunately, not many bright line rules can easily be articu-
lated with respect to intangible intellectual property rights.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF FORUM SHOPPING IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
The selection of a forum initially belongs exclusively to the plain-
tiff who files the lawsuit. There are many reasons that a party may
15. Justice Joseph Story was also a seminal figure in developing multilateralism, and, in
fact, he was a significant influence upon Savigny. Juenger, supra note 10, at 91. See JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865)
(1834).
16. Juenger, supra note 9, at 47-48.
17. See Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century,
37 WILLAMETTE L. REV 1, 18-19, 39-41 (2001).
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believe that a particular jurisdiction is preferable for its intellectual
property dispute. In selecting a forum the plaintiff would likely con-
sider the following: the knowledge, background, and experience of
the judges; the judges' previous experience with high technology or
intellectual property matters;18 whether the nation permits jury reso-
lution of intellectual property matters;19 the attorney's familiarity with
the judges; the court's docket and its speed in resolving cases; 0 the
reputation of the parties in the nation;21 and, of course, traditional
factors, such as the convenience for the parties, witnesses and attor-
neys.
In a world characterized by a great variation in substantive and
procedural rules among different jurisdictions, the litigants can bene-
fit by strategically engaging in forum selection. As it has been sug-
gested, the outcome of the case can be independently influenced by
(a) procedural variations, or (b) substantive variations in the applica-
ble law, such that the outcome can vary by jurisdiction or adjudicator
even when the facts and the law are the same. The evils of forum
shopping generally revolve around two themes: (1) the notion that fo-
rum shopping reflects inequity in the legal system; and (2) the prem-
ise that forum shopping is inefficient.
18. In Germany, for example, there is a German Patent Court with technically trained
judges that resolve all patent cases brought in Germany. See generally Ernst K. Pakuscher, The
Symbiosis of Lawyers and Natural Scientists as Judges of the Federal Patent Court in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 9 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 215 (1994) (discussing the history, operation,
and organization of the Federal Patent Court of the Federal Republic of Germany); see also
Kong-Woong Choe, The Role of the Korean Patent Court, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 473 (2000)
(discussing the establishment of the Korean Patent Court).
19. The United States is among the minority of countries that permits jury trials of
intellectual property matters and has come under considerable criticism for doing so. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Schmitt, Court May Consider Some Limits on Juries' Role in Patent Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6 (quoting patent attorney Donald Dunner as saying: "Give jurors a
complicated biotechnology case or one involving lasers or computers, and their eyes glaze over"
and Professor Martin J. Adelman, who believes that jury confusion has created "a system of
justice that is basically a lottery."); Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White Knight' Draws Cries of
'Patent Blackmail', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990, at C5 (describing a jury trial of a patent case as "a
'judicial lottery,' an often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those who are
sufficiently aggressive").
20. Certain courts-such as the Eastern District of Virginia-have a reputation for quick
case resolution while others-such as the Italian courts-have a reputation for slow case
resolution. Intellectual property rights holders often prefer expedient resolution of disputes to
obtain an injunction that prevents further infringement.
21. Many parties believe that particular fora may be hostile or biased against foreign
parties and that this xenophobia could impact outcome. See, e.g., Jack L. Lahr, Bias and
Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and Other Technology Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIR.
B.J. 405 (1992) (discussing the widespread perception that foreign corporations will be treated
unfairly in US jury trials due to jury bias and prejudice against foreigners).
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A. The Normative Evils of Forum Shopping
It is a fundamental tenet of any legal system that the law ought
not be manipulable and its application ought to be uniform. 2 This is
difficult to achieve on a national basis even where all the courts and
judges are applying their own nation's laws. The advent of the Inter-
net has facilitated borderless commerce-for intangible property
rights the potential for simultaneous infringement in multiple interna-
tional jurisdictions is high. The result is that intellectual property
rights holders will have choices among possible jurisdictions to bring
their lawsuit. When litigants have more choice among potential fora,
consistency among fora and their application of law becomes more
acute.
Forum shopping is problematic for any individual country where
its inhabitants may bring suit in multiple potential courts. An empiri-
cal study limited to the United States has shown significant incentive
for forum shopping of patent cases among the various US district
courts where suits could be brought.2 3 This study showed differing
procedural and substantive resolution of cases in the various US dis-
trict courts. This is true despite the fact that these are all US courts,
applying US patent law. This manipulability of the administration of
law thwarts the ideal of neutrality in a system whose objective is to
create a level playing field for resolution of disputes. 24 The intensity
of forum shopping suggests that the view of law as immutable is ulti-
mately unfulfillable.25 The ultimate result is unpredictability and in-
consistency in the application of the law among jurisdictions. This
instability erodes public confidence in the law and its enforcement
and creates doubt about the fairness of the system.26
22. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924 (2001).
23. Id. at 901-24 (presenting the results of an empirical study of 9,615 patent cases over the
five-year period from 1995-1999 and concluding that US district courts vary in their procedural
and substantive resolution of patent cases).
24. See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a
Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 668 (1993). But see Robert M.
Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639, 650-57, 672-80 (1981) (arguing that providing multiple fora with concurrent
jurisdiction serves the beneficial function of error reduction and results in a fairer and more
innovative judicial system).
25. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1685-86 (1990).
26. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 305-07 (1996).
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This problem is greatly magnified when the opportunity exists to
bring suit anywhere in the world. If difficulty exists in achieving con-
sistency intranationally-where courts apply their own nation's
laws-imagine the difficulty where parties have the option of engag-
ing a court utilizing unfamiliar law. If choice of international jurisdic-
tion is unfettered, forum shopping will be rampant.27
B. The Economic Inefficiency of Forum Shopping
Commentators question the efficiency of forum shopping for
several reasons. First, some have argued that forum shopping over-
burdens preferred courts with a flood of cases.28 If the intellectual
property rights holders are consistently plaintiffs, suits are likely to be
consolidated in the jurisdictions that rights holders perceive as most
favorable.29 This may not, however, actually be inefficient. In theory,
if the total number of cases remains constant and the only variable is
where the cases are brought, it would be more efficient to have those
cases consolidated in discrete courts that could develop expertise in
the area. For example, if most patent cases were brought in a few
choice jurisdictions (creating a group of patent courts), the judges in
those jurisdictions would develop expertise with patent case man-
agement and patent law. These judges would be more efficient at re-
solving patent cases because, even though the technology changes
from case to case, their exposure to the substantive law and its appli-
cation would improve judicial efficiency. Over time, these courts
would also establish track records, increasing outcome predictability
and decreasing litigation.
A single, specialized international trial court with adjudicatory
authority over all intellectual property disputes would, of course,
maximize efficiency. Such a court would eliminate forum shopping
and eliminate the specter of outcome inconsistency. It is, however,
27. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 553, 560-62 (1989) (discussing preference among tort plaintiffs to bring suit in the US
because of generous juries and liberal procedure); David W. Maher, Trademark Law on the
Internet-Will It Scale? The Challenge to Develop International Trademark Law, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. LAW 3, 12 (1997) (discussing the global scope of the Internet
and the potential for jurisdictional uncertainties between nations); Joseph H. Sommer, Against
Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1209 (2000) (stating that forum shopping arises as a
problem in international disputes).
28. See Note, supra note 25, at 1684.
29. See Moore, supra note 22, at 904 (indicating that US district court patent cases are
largely consolidated in a few select jurisdictions).
2002]
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extremely unlikely that nations would be willing to entirely relinquish
control over adjudication of their intellectual property cases.
Second, forum shopping wastes resources by increasing litigation
costs as parties dispute forum or pursue the most favorable forum,
which often is not the closest or most convenient location. 30 The
Draft Convention subjects corporations to jurisdiction wherever they
sell products, which is increasingly internationally. This would create
a large number of possible fora. According to the Draft Convention,
the parties and all of the courts with parallel jurisdiction are then
supposed to collaborate to ascertain the most appropriate forum. Al-
though resources will be spent in the "collaboration" over the proper
venue, if an agreement can ultimately be reached that will be en-
forced by all affected jurisdictions, the Draft Convention's approach
will certainly be more efficient than relitigating the issues in each na-
tion.
C. Forum Variation Undermines the Innovation Incentive
Underlying Intellectual Property
Intellectual property rights are thought to be critical in spurring
technological innovation." The value of intellectual property lies in
its guarantee of exclusivity, providing its owner a defined property
right. This value depends on the boundaries of the property right,
competitors' respect for those boundaries, and the ability of the right-
holder to enforce them. If the property owners' ability to enforce
their intellectual property is inefficient or unpredictable, its value de-
creases for its owner, competitors, and the public, thereby stifling in-
novation and competition.3 2
Unpredictability or uncertainty in the boundaries of intellectual
property rights and their enforceability will have several ramifica-
30. See Note, supra note 25, at 1691 ("Critics of forum shopping claim that it is inefficient
because it tends to result in litigation far from the 'natural' forum-the one closest to, most
knowledgeable about, or most accessible to the litigants.").
31. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (1989); see also King Instruments Corp. v.
Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the patent system "creates an incentive for
innovation").
32. In its report to the Secretary of Commerce, the Advisory Commission on Patent Law
Reform warned that the problems associated with the enforcement of patent rights "have the
potential to eradicate the basic incentive provided by the patent system" and that the inherent
value of the patent right can be realized only if the property owner has effective and inexpensive
access to an efficient judicial system. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM,
A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 75 (1992).
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tions. It will divert resources from innovative efforts (research and
development) to enforcement (transaction or litigation costs),33 de-
creasing the value of the property right and thereby decreasing its ef-
ficacy as a means for promoting innovation. Moreover, uncertainty in
the boundaries of the proprietary right will decrease innovation by
erratically expanding or contracting the patent holder's scope of ex-
clusivity.
34
Two possible scenarios result when the delineation and enforce-
ment of property rights are uncertain: (1) competitors will have less
respect for the property right, causing an increase in transaction costs
and a decrease in value of the property right as a means for promot-
ing innovation; or (2) competitors will effectively broaden the prop-
erty right to increase certainty and avoid transaction costs, thereby
eliminating competition. When uncertainty in the application of a le-
gal standard exists, parties will either overcomply or undercomply
with the legal standard, modifying their behavior more than or less
than the law requires.35
If uncertainty exists in the application of a legal standard, even
parties who normally would behave efficiently will face a greater
chance of being held liable because of the unpredictability. 36 The only
way that these parties can reduce that chance is by overcomplying
with the legal rule.37 Such behavior is inefficient as it will contract
33. Many commentators have lamented the increased transaction costs caused by
unpredictable, fuzzy, or muddy rules. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information,
Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 312-20 (1984) (favoring
sharper, clearer rules); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 321, 322-37 (1985) (favoring clear, specific definitions because they lower information
and transaction costs); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 591 (1988) ("Hard-edged rules define assets and their ownership in such a way that what is
bought stays bought and can be safely traded to others, instead of repeatedly being put up for
grabs.").
34. The Markman Court reasoned:
As we noted in General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938),
"[tihe limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of
the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." Otherwise, a "zone of
uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of
infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal
foreclosure of the field."
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (quoting United Carbon Co.
v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
35. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965-66 (1984) (concluding that socially inefficient
overcompliance or undercompliance results from uncertain legal standards even when the
parties are risk neutral).




industry output and raise prices. For example, if a copyright holder
has a copyright on a product with which a competitor would like to
compete and the enforceability of the copyright is uncertain in scope,
the competitor would likely provide the copyright holder with a larger
monopoly zone than the copyright itself actually entitles. In effect the
zone of the copyright holder's monopoly-the zone of no compe-
tition-would expand beyond that society contemplated when the
copyright was issued. In such a case, if the competitor elects to
compete at all with the copyrighted product, it would do so in a less
than optimal fashion.
No scenario-neither where the copyright owner gets a substan-
tially diminished property right nor where the copyright owner gets a
substantially expanded property right-will optimally promote inno-
vation.38 Both modify the system of incentives that exists for securing
the copyright property right, tipping the careful balance that has been
struck between the copyright owner and the public, which ensures
competition and tolerates limited monopolies to promote innovation.
With the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, the impact of uncertainty
in choice of venue is actually more predictably one-sided in favor of
the intellectual property right owner. In patent cases, for example,
generally the patent holder selects whether to bring suit and venue.
This is true despite the ability of the defendant, in certain circum-
stances, to bring a declaratory judgment action. The "race to the
courthouse" is within the plaintiff's (i.e., the intellectual property
rights holder's) control because declaratory judgment actions for
noninfringement of intellectual property rights cannot be brought ab-
sent a threat of suit by the rights holder.39 In this manner, the rights
holder controls-in all instances- whether a suit can be brought.
38. Contra Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (1999) (arguing that constraints on the patentee's
monopoly caused by consistent undercompliance may be efficient as it enhances competition).
39. Although in some limited circumstances the infringer may be able to select venue by
bringing a declaratory judgment action, a declaratory judgment action can only be brought
against the patent holder when the patent holder places the infringer in reasonable
apprehension of being sued, which requires affirmative action by the patent holder. Intellectual
Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that in order to bring a declaratory judgment action an infringer must prove "an explicit threat
or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 216 (2001);
EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that an infringer must
have a "reasonable apprehension" of being sued by the patent holder before filing a declaratory
judgment action). Hence, control in this circumstance remains in the patent holder's hands.
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The defendant infringer, however, controls the potential fora by
selecting where to locate and where to sell infringing products-a
process made considerably easier by the advent of the Internet. In
this manner the defendant gets to limit the jurisdictions in which it
can be subject to suit.40 Accordingly, in most traditional legal regimes
where venue turns on broad mutable factors such as personal jurisdic-
tion, defendants may be able to control where they are sued by con-
trolling the location of their sales.
Although there is usually unpredictability in permitting choice
from among many potential fora, that unpredictability is greatly miti-
gated in a system in which the choice belongs exclusively or consis-
tently to one of the parties. If infringers behave strategically they will
predictably limit their sales to regions with favorable law. In these ju-
risdictions we would expect systematic undercompliance with intellec-
tual property rights, which would contract the right, making it less
valuable.
In a system where the intellectual property rights holder system-
atically selects the forum, the defendant may not know exactly which
nation she will be sued in, but because she knows that the intellectual
property rights holder gets to select the forum, she can predict that
the property owner will choose the most favorable forum. In these
circumstances, infringers will systematically make ex ante product and
design decisions in a manner most favorable to the rights holder. The
infringer will systematically overcomply with the scope of the ex-
clusive right, consistently expanding the property right beyond what
was intended when it was granted.
Of course, this analysis assumes one-dimensional decision mak-
ing by the intellectual property owner and the infringer/defendant.
Parties, however, may select particular judicial districts for a variety
of reasons, including speed of adjudication or chance of getting to
trial, and not purely on win rate.41 In short, the choice of venue is ac-
tually a multidimensional decision blurring the ability to predict
venue choices. This uncertainty may result in a mixture of under- and
There is also the possibility that the infringer will be successful in getting a case transferred.
This could add some uncertainty to the calculus.
40. The new cyber-marketplace also expands jurisdictions in which suits can be brought
simply by making it easier for defendants to compete in international commerce. Of course, the
choice of whether to enter a market and thereby subject themselves to personal jurisdiction
there is still up to the defendant infringers.
41. See Moore, supra note 22, at 916-20, 937 (empirically substantiating that several of the
most popular jurisdictions for patent cases do not have high patent holder win rates, but are
advantageous for other reasons).
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overcompliance. In either event, the careful balance between the
rights holder and society has been tipped.
III. RETHINKING FORUM SHOPPING IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
In a world where relocation costs are low, such as a virtual relo-
cation world in cyberspace, several of the traditional criteria of juris-
diction become vulnerable to strategic behavior by the parties.42 In
this Section, we consider the issue of forum shopping through the
lenses of economic analysis to evaluate the dynamics of strategic fo-
rum shopping, and the resulting problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard. We present a simple taxonomy of strategic problems,
sketching some corollaries for the design of conflict of law rules.
A. Incentive versus Distributional Consequences of Forum Shopping
As discussed above, the existence of overlapping adjudicatory ju-
risdictions generally creates the opportunity for forum shopping. Par-
ties can maximize their expected return from litigation by strategically
affecting the choice of forum. While forum shopping generally takes
place after the parties have chosen their conduct within the relevant
legal relationship, rational actors often envision the opportunity for
ex post forum shopping, with ex ante effects on their choice of con-
duct. A fundamental insight of law and economics has a direct appli-
cation to this context: rules that are designed to operate retro-
spectively after the fact (e.g., rules concerning the jurisdictional
competence of different courts) are often strategically accounted for
by the parties, producing ex ante effects on individual behavior.
These problems are exacerbated in a world where virtual relocation
costs are low and where the traditional criteria of jurisdiction reveal
their intrinsic limitations.
Strategic forum selection has distributional and efficiency effects
which vary according to whether the parties find themselves in sym-
metric or asymmetric positions.
(a) Ex Ante Symmetry. Inasmuch as the status of plaintiff is ran-
domly determined, the distributional effects have no ex ante impact
42. Unlike typical private law situations where "residence" is not established for the sole
purpose of ensuring a favorable forum for a future litigation, in IP cases we can imagine firms
and companies establishing companies in a given jurisdiction in order to minimize their
expected liability costs.
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on individual incentives. That is to say, if at the time of entering into
their legal relationship the parties face symmetric ex ante prospects
(based on the equal prior probabilities to be involved in a dispute as
plaintiffs or defendants), such parties would have incentives to act ef-
ficiently with no ex ante adverse selection. However, once the veil of
uncertainty is lifted (i.e., once the parties have effectively entered into
a relationship and a dispute has arisen), parties are likely to act stra-
tegically with respect to the forum selection choice, since their role as
plaintiffs or defendants is now fully known. In this group of cases, the
parties' ex ante symmetry implies that forum shopping only has ex
post effects.
(b) Ex Ante Asymmetry. Different conclusions are reached if we
allow for ex ante asymmetries. If some individuals are statistically
more likely to be plaintiffs than defendants, a second strategic prob-
lem will emerge, given the differential impact of ex ante jurisdictional
selection on the costs and benefits of the parties. In this case, forum
shopping may have ex ante distributional and incentive effects.
In the following discussion, we examine the case of systematic
outcome variations with asymmetric parties. The focus on such a case
is carried out with no prejudice to the generality of the analysis be-
cause the hypothesis of ex ante symmetry is a special case of the
asymmetric problem, in which one dimension of the problem (i.e., the
ex ante adverse selection) is suppressed. "3
B. The Strategic Moments of Forum Shopping
From a law and economics perspective, forum shopping is prob-
lematic because it can give rise to adverse selection" and moral haz-
43. We believe that the condition of asymmetry is of greater practical significance, since it
allows for the parties within any given legal relationship to face different probabilities to be
plaintiffs or defendants if a dispute arises. These variations can induce strategic forum shopping
and thus affect the incentives of the parties. Nonsystematic outcome variations, while having ex
post distributional effects, have no ex ante impact on the costs and incentives of the parties and
thus cannot be strategically relied upon.
44. Adverse selection problems are the consequence of informational asymmetries and ex
ante strategic behavior of the informed party. The typical textbook example of adverse
selection applies to the used car market in which sellers have better information than potential
buyers on the quality (and defects) of the car. Under such a scenario of asymmetric
information, sellers of poor-quality cars (lemons) are more likely to sell their cars at the going
market price. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981); Michael
Spence, Job Market Signalling, 87 Q.J. ECON 355 (1973); William Samuelson, Bargaining Under
Asymmetric Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 995 (1984). In our context, adverse selection
refers to the ex ante strategic advantage of a party in the selection of his counterpart. Such
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ard problems .4 To the extent that jurisdictional choice may affect the
liability of the actors, parties may face strategic problems of different
types, according to the sequence of their strategic choices.
There are two chronologically distinct moments where strategic
choices become relevant.
(a) Strategic Participation Choice. The first important moment of
the strategic problem concerns the adverse selection of the parties
when deciding whether to participate in a given relationship. The
matching of a potential plaintiff with his defendant may be directly
controlled by one party or the other. For example, in an intentional
tort situation, the defendant generally has an opportunity to choose
his own plaintiff. The opposite may hold in other quasicontractual
relationships. In yet other situations, both parties control their par-
ticipation in a relationship, such as for the case of consensual contrac-
tual relationships. For the purpose of our taxonomy, these situations
are considered as if neither party controls the participation choice,
given the fact that neither party can single-handedly coerce the other
party to participate.
(b) Strategic Ex Post Forum Choice. The second relevant mo-
ment for the analysis of our problem concerns the selection of the
competent jurisdiction. Depending on the choice of connecting fac-
tor, one party or the other may have a greater opportunity to influ-
ence forum selection. For example, if the competent forum is linked
to the place of residence of the defendant, the defendant has better
control than the plaintiff over such a connecting factor. Likewise, if
the competent jurisdiction for products liability is the place of acci-
dent, the plaintiff has a better opportunity to control the jurisdictional
choice by choosing where to use the product. In a world with costless
virtual relocation, several of the traditional connecting factors (e.g.,
place of business, residence, etc.) can be manipulated by the parties,
effectively granting them direct control over the jurisdictional choice.
strategic advantage often materializes in a participation choice in a legal relationship, when the
other contracting party has no effective choice opportunity or exit option.
45. Moral hazard problems are due to a divergence between the private marginal cost of
some action and its social marginal cost, which results in an allocation of resources that is
suboptimal. The typical textbook example of moral hazard refers to an insurance scenario in
which a party who has full theft insurance has suboptimal incentives to take precautions against
theft (e.g., locking his car, parking in a safe place, etc.). See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Bengt Holmstrdm, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON.
74 (1979). In out context, moral hazard generally refers to the ex post opportunism of a party
that, relying on the jurisdictional choice of forum that he strategically controls, has less than
optimal incentives to behave efficiently in the ongoing legal relationship with the other party.
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The presence of strategic participation and forum selection
choices by the parties allows us to map nine alternative scenarios, in
which the presence (or lack thereof) of unilateral or bilateral strategic
opportunities for the parties generates an array of adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Table 1 represents the effect of the par-
ties' ex ante participation choice and ex post forum choice on the ad-
verse selection and moral hazard behavior of the parties.
Table 1: The Strategic Moments of Forum Shopping
EX POST CHOICE OF FORUM
Plaintiff (n) Neither Defendant (A)
i's Adverse t's it's AdverseZ Plaintiff0 Ptif Selection + iT's Adverse Selection + A's
Moral Hazard Selection Moral Hazard
<
Neither it's Moral Hazard None A's Moral Hazard
A's Adverse A's A's Adverse
< eedn Selection + it's Adverse Selection + A's
( Moral Hazard Selection Moral Hazard
Table 1 reveals an interesting interaction between the strategic
participation choice and the strategic ex post forum selection choice.
By allowing for cases in which neither party can effectively influence
the participation or forum selection choices (i.e., situations labeled
"Neither" in Table 1), we identify a total of nine possibilities.
The ideal benchmark case for our analysis is the one where nei-
ther party has any control over the participation or forum selection
variables (i.e., case marked "None" in Table 1). An illustration of
such an ideal case could be the case of a voluntary transaction in a
competitive marketplace in which neither party has any ability to in-
fluence the forum selection without the consent of the other party.
The eight remaining scenarios represent departures from the bench-
mark case. In all such cases plaintiffs and/or defendants control par-
ticipation or forum selection choices.
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The first two cases represent the most relevant and problematic
departures from the benchmark case. These are cases of unilateral
strategic opportunity for one party with no exit option for the coun-
terpart. One of the parties controls both the participation and the fo-
rum selection choice. In one such case, the plaintiff holds such dual
strategic advantage (i.e., the top-row/left-column case); while in the
other case, the defendant holds the dual strategic advantage (i.e., the
bottom-row/right-column case). In the absence of price mechanisms
capable of correcting such strategic advantage, the absence of an exit
option creates an opportunity for exploitation of the other party. For
example, imagine an individual who could control both the participa-
tion choice and the choice of jurisdiction (e.g., a tortfeasor who can
choose his own victim, with no opportunity for the victim to prevent
such involuntary relationship). We could expect this situation to be
quite problematic and affected by ex ante adverse selection and ex
post moral hazard problems. Namely, the tortfeasor would likely
choose the best victim for his own tort and yet minimize his expected
liability costs by selecting the most pro-defendant jurisdiction. This
would likely lead to inefficient outcomes, with a suboptimal level of
liability and deterrence and an excessive level of torts.
In four intermediate cases (i.e., all cases located in the middle-
row and middle-column, other than the benchmark case), only one of
the two strategic choices is effectively controlled by one of the play-
ers. This group of situations probably encompasses the most frequent
cases of strategic participation and forum shopping, giving rise to
unilateral adverse selection and moral hazard problems. As a simple
illustration, we can think of the case in which the parties are ran-
domly matched, with neither party controlling the participation
choice, and where one of the parties controls the forum selection. In
such cases, even though the parties cannot engage in ex ante adverse
selection, they will act strategically in the forum selection, in order to
maximize their net benefit from the relationship. Symmetrically, if
neither party controls the forum selection, but one party controls the
participation choice, ex ante adverse selection would likely take
place.
The last two cases are interestingly characterized by the presence
of bilateral strategic problems, in which both parties control one, and
only one, of the two strategic moments. As seen in Table 1, the bot-
tom-row/left-column case describes a situation where the defendant
controls the participation choice and the plaintiff controls the forum
[Vol. 77:1325
RETHINKING FORUM SHOPPING IN CYBERSPACE
selection variable (i.e., the defendant chooses his own plaintiff and
the plaintiff has an exit option). Conversely, in the top-row/right-
column case, the plaintiff controls the participation variable and the
defendant controls the forum selection (i.e., the plaintiff chooses his
own defendant and the defendant has an exit option). The opportu-
nity for bilateral strategic behavior distinguishes these two hypotheses
from all the previously examined scenarios. Interestingly, the
presence of bilateral strategic opportunities can mitigate the problems
of unilateral strategies that affect the other six scenarios. Bilateral
strategic opportunities (under the form of abstained participation or
ex post biased forum selection) allow one party to minimize the
impact of the strategic behavior of the other party. In all such cases
of bilateral adverse selection and moral hazard behavior, we would
expect the equilibrium choice of jurisdiction to approach (but not
necessarily coincide with) the ideal outcome of a nonstrategic rela-
tionship or a bargained-for choice of forum. In this setting, the pres-
ence of two strategic problems, if appropriately combined, generates
an outcome that is socially preferable to all the alternative unilateral
strategy equilibria. While this outcome may fall short of reaching the
ideal benchmark of nonstrategic behavior, it would nevertheless con-
stitute an improvement -possibly a substantial improvement- over
the alternative unilateral problems.
The proof of this claim involves a mathematical elaboration that
would fall outside the confines of the present analysis. We can never-
theless find some intuitive support for this result considering the in-
teraction between the strategic choices of the two parties. First,
consider an example where the defendant controls the participation
variable, choosing his own plaintiff, and where the plaintiff can con-
trol the forum selection. This could be the case of an intentional tort,
where the tortfeasor chooses his own victim, with no opportunity for
the victim to avoid such involuntary relationship. In this case, if the
victim controls the forum selection, the choice would lead to the ju-
risdiction that grants the highest expected level of victim's compensa-
tion. Thus the ex post strategic choice of the victim would increase
tortfeasors' liability and deterrence, offsetting the potential ex ante
adverse selection of the tortfeasor. Similarly, an offsetting dynamic
could also be expected if the plaintiff controls the participation vari-
able and the defendant controls the forum selection. In both these
cases the opportunity for bilateral strategic behavior for the parties
would mitigate the extent of the unilateral adverse selection and
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moral hazard problems that are present in the other unilateral cases
lacking an exit option.
In real-life problems, the first moment of the strategic problem
that we have considered (i.e., the participation choice) is generally
controlled by one of the parties, who enjoys an exogenous advantage
in the selection of his counterpart. Such advantage is exogenously
given by the intrinsic nature of the relationship or market structure,
and cannot easily be influenced by the legal system. Conversely, the
second moment of our strategic problem (i.e., the forum selection
choice) is endogenously influenced by the legal system, which deter-
mines the connecting factors for jurisdictional conflicts. The above
analysis, therefore, has very interesting policy implications for the ap-
propriate design of conflict of law and jurisdictional competence
rules. Namely, the important wisdom of the game-theoretic analysis
suggests the following rules of thumb: (a) when neither party single-
handedly controls the participation choice (such as in the case of a
voluntary transaction in a competitive marketplace), the appropriate
jurisdiction should be determined on the basis of connecting factors
that cannot be single-handedly influenced by either party; (b) when
only one of the parties has an exit option, controlling the participation
choice of the other party, and in the absence of price mechanisms for
correcting the parties' adverse selection, the appropriate forum
selection rules should give an advantage to the party without an exit
option.
C. Race to the Courthouse and the Issue of Order Dependence
When the control of forum selection depends on the sequence
(or order) of moves of the parties, opportunities for strategic forum
shopping are present. Some criteria of jurisdiction are order-
dependent because the status of one party as defendant (or plaintiff)
depends on the order of moves of the parties in the litigation process.
For example, criteria of jurisdiction linked to the residency or place of
business of the defendant (or plaintiff) are order-dependent, since the
status of one party as defendant is contingent upon the existence of
another party first filing suit against him and vice versa. As discussed
above, if some individuals are statistically more likely to be plaintiffs
than defendants, such as property rights holders (copyright owner,
patentee, or trademark owner), the opportunity for forum shopping
may have distributional effects with a potential impact on the ex ante
incentives of the parties. Another effect of order-dependent criteria
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of jurisdiction is given by the fact that in some situations potential
litigants may attempt to exploit the plaintiff's advantage in forum
selection. This may trigger a "race to the courthouse," inducing
potential defendants to expedite their filing in order to preempt the
opponent's choice of jurisdiction. The "race to the courthouse" may
inefficiently accelerate the filing process, bringing to trial cases that
may not have matured into court claims had they been left to the
choice of the natural plaintiff.
In this setting, the ex post choice of forum is strategically deter-
mined, and the equilibrium solution of a forum shopping game is not
likely to produce the most efficient level of litigation, nor lead to the
optimal choice of law and jurisdiction. Continental conflict of law
scholars have attempted to identify connecting factors that would
avoid the undesirable effects of order-dependence, at least in those
cases where forum shopping may result in the application of different
substantive laws. 46 The most problematic cases of forum shopping are
those with first-mover advantage problems and order-dependent
criteria of jurisdiction.
In the absence of uniformity in the substantive law and in the
conflicts rules, jurisdictional rules become critical factors in deter-
mining "uniformity" of outcomes and forum shopping. In such case,
jurisdiction rules are sufficient to guarantee substantive and proce-
dural uniformity47 only if they are not order-dependent.
IV. FORUM SHOPPING AND THE DESIGN OF FORUM SELECTION
RULES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As the drafters of the proposal point out, unlike the Brussels
Convention (which uses personal jurisdiction to identify the single
most appropriate forum for the resolution of a particular dispute),
and unlike the Hague Convention (which uses personal jurisdiction to
create a narrow range of appropriate choices), the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal identifies a set of fora with adjudicatory authority over the
parties. This approach is admittedly followed in order to promote
consolidation of cases and cooperation, in many ways resembling the
multilateralist approaches of recent European trends.
46. See, e.g., GIUSEPPE BARILE, LEZIONI DI DIRTro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 97-124
(2d ed. 1980).
47. Interestingly, this is a feature that no other instrument can single-handedly deliver.
When applied to outcomes, uniformity is meant in the sense of "predictable," i.e., same
outcome for the same case regardless of ex post strategic choices of the parties.
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According to the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, the parties'
choices need not be narrowed if all courts seized with parallel litiga-
tion can be encouraged to consult with one another (and with the par-
ties) to find the best place to adjudicate the entire dispute. By the
same token, the proposal introduces greater degrees of freedom in
the selection of a better forum if several courts enjoy adjudicatory
authority. Such criterion is applied with consideration of the con-
venience of alternative fora for the parties and witnesses, the exper-
tise of the decision maker, and the relationship of the forum
jurisdiction to the dispute. This solution is fully coherent with the re-
alization that forum shopping in intellectual property disputes cannot
be controlled through personal jurisdiction rules. As discussed above,
this approach seems quite sensible in the context of intellectual prop-
erty protection in a borderless cyber-economy, where intangible
rights and infringements can be "reified" in too many locations to
make personal jurisdiction an effective conflict of law criterion for the
determination of jurisdictional competence. 48
A. Single-Defendant Cases
The basic rule establishing jurisdictional competence is set out in
article 3 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, which substantially re-
produces article 3 of the 1999 Hague Draft.
Article 3 Defendant's Forum
Subject to the provisions of the Convention, a defendant may
be sued in the courts of the State where that defendant is habitually
resident.49
The default jurisdictional rule of the Hague Convention and
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposals can be evaluated in light of the issues of
strategic forum selection and order-dependence.
First, with respect to the issue of strategic forum selection, the
criterion of "habitual residence" raises possible problems when ap-
plied to a cyber world with costless relocation of virtual entities. The
commentary of the Hague Draft Convention reveals lack of consen-
sus on the appropriate definition of this default criterion of jurisdic-
tion.50 With respect to entity or person other than a natural person,
48. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1069.
49. Id. at 1075 (art. 3.1).
50. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome of the
Discussion in Commission If of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001, at
n.17 (2001) (summarizing disagreement over definition of "habitual residence"), available at
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the Convention refers alternatively to statutory seat, place of incor-
poration or formation, place of central administration, or principal
place of business. In addition to such practical difficulties in imple-
mentation, this criterion allows for no exceptions to correct for the
dual strategic problem discussed in Section III.B. To the extent that
intellectual property problems give potential plaintiffs no exit option
(i.e., no control of the participation variable), the defendant's forum
may create double adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Fortunately, price mechanisms are likely to be in place in this area of
the law, so that the defendant-dependent choice of jurisdiction may
be preemptively corrected by the potential defendant's precommit-
ment to an efficient jurisdiction as a means to discount the resulting
efficiency gain from the expected cost of the transaction. Absent such
price mechanisms, the defendant's forum may engender adverse
selection and moral hazard problems because the defendant would
generally enjoy a last-mover advantage (i.e., the defendant selects his
own plaintiff, not vice-versa). If the plaintiff cannot price-
discriminate between different types of defendants, strategic dead-
weight losses would therefore arise.
Second, the defendant's forum rule can be evaluated with respect
to the order-dependence issue. The idea that the default defendant's
forum rule is not order dependent is based on the premise that, in any
given case, there is generally only one "natural" defendant. This may
be a correct premise in most scenarios, but not without exceptions.
Two main groups of cases have the potential of rendering the defen-
dant's forum rule order-dependent. One, situations where the owner-
ship of an entitlement is uncertain and where two or more parties are
actively utilizing such resource are characterized by a symmetry be-
tween the positions of the various contenders, such that any one party
is a potential plaintiff against all others. Two, even when entitlements
are clearly allocated between the parties, the defendant's forum rule
could be affected by the would-be defendant's filing of a declaratory
judgment. The proposed draft convention effectively addresses this
latter problem in Articles 8 and 10, which will be discussed later in
this Section.





Multiple-defendant cases generally present complex problems
that require a balancing of different concerns of procedural economy
and predictability of judicial outcomes. The drafters of the proposed
convention observe that as the economy becomes globalized, consoli-
dation will prove increasingly necessary to achieve procedural econ-
omy. In the area of intellectual property, consolidation of parallel
claims becomes particularly critical since rights in intangible works
and rights over electronically transmissible products (such as digitized
text, music or video files) can be readily accessed in different loca-
tions, making parallel infringements in multiple jurisdictions increas-
ingly likely. The creation of a streamlined procedure to consolidate
actions is thus necessary to promote the efficient adjudication of such
disputes. The consolidation of claims will not avoid conflicting out-
comes derived from the application of different substantive laws ap-
plicable to different branches of the dispute. Since the substantive
intellectual property law is not harmonized among the contracting
states, certain differences in outcomes will remain inevitable. Inter-
estingly, however, the drafters believe that jurisdiction-driven differ-
ences in outcome are not negligible and explicitly point out that an
important effect of article 10 of their proposal is the avoidance of in-
consistent results.
Article 10 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal specifies a stream-
lined procedure for the consolidation of multi-defendant cases:
Article 10 Multiple Defendants
1. A plaintiff bringing an action against a defendant in a court
of the State in which that defendant is habitually resident may also
proceed in that court against other defendants not habitually resi-
dent in that State if....
c. as between the States in which the other defendants are ha-
bitually resident, and the forum, the forum is the most closely re-
lated to the entire dispute, and there is no other forum in which the
entire dispute could be adjudicated.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a codefendant invoking an ex-
clusive choice of court clause agreed with the plaintiff and con-
forming with Article 4.51
Article 10 of the proposal strikes a very sensible balance of the
economic considerations examined above. Besides the obvious ad-
vantages for procedural economy, the unification minimizes the ad-
51. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1078-79 (art. 10).
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verse selection problems. No single defendant can unilaterally
influence the choice of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the choice of the
"most closely related forum" is not order-dependent, and such a cri-
terion avoids the race-to-the-courthouse problems that may be pre-
sent under the single-defendant cases.
We should further note that the "most closely related" test does
not override an express choice of forum by the parties. This is neces-
sary to avoid disturbing situations where the parties had an opportu-
nity to "price" the actual choice of law and jurisdiction in their
transaction.
C. Jurisdiction for Declaratory Judgments and Lis Pendens
As observed above, declaratory judgment actions frequently
open up forum shopping opportunities by allowing would-be defen-
dants to file for a declaratory judgment in a different jurisdiction.
The relevance of declaratory judgment actions should be appraised in
conjunction with procedural rules concerning lis pendens and res judi-
cata. Whenever jurisdictional rules are order-dependent, they can
point to more than one alternative fora with jurisdictional compe-
tence to hear a case, according to the order of filing of parallel
claims. 2 For example, if the lis pendens rule is applied according to
the European standards, 3 giving absolute preference to the court first
seized, a troublesome opportunity for strategic filings would be cre-
ated. Such strategic filing for a declaratory judgment could be aimed
at delaying a negative judgment on the matter or at obtaining a more
favorable judgment by the court chosen by the would-be defendants.
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal follows the Hague Conven-
tion's approach, creating a presumption in favor of the forum first
seized. However, article 12.5 of the proposal creates an important
exception to the presumption in favor of the court first seized, allow-
ing a rebuttal of such presumption.
Article 8 Declaratory Judgments:
52. Procedural rules of lis pendens generally address problems of this sort in order to avoid
parallel litigation.
53. Other jurisdictions leave greater margins of discretion in the application of the lis
pendens doctrine. Yet such margin of discretion to select the appropriate forum, unless
selectively used to combat the strategic problems mentioned above, would not eliminate the
underlying risk of forum shopping.
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1. Actions for a declaration of rights may be brought on the
same terms as an action seeking substantive relief. ... 14
Article 12 Lis Pendens:...
5. If in the action before the court first seized, the plaintiff
seeks a determination that it has no obligation to the defendant,
and if an action seeking substantive relief is brought in the court
second seized -
a. the provisions of paragraphs 1-4 above shall not apply to the
court second seized, unless the declaratory judgment plaintiff has
advanced its claim as part of an action initiated before the court
first seized by the declaratory judgment defendant, and
b. the court first seized shall suspend the proceedings at the re-
quest of a party if the court second seized is expected to render a
decision capable of being recognized under the Convention.55
The drafters of the Convention are aware of the special problems
raised by this group of cases, as amusingly discussed with reference to
the Italian Torpedo case, where "a declaratory filing is made in an
Italian court, where dockets move slowly, in order to block adjudica-
tion of an infringement action in a forum more likely to quickly award
injunctive relief. '5 6 In this context, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal
intelligently preempts the otherwise pervasive risk of strategic misuse
of declaratory judgment actions; article 12.5 does not treat a pending
declaratory judgment case as lis pendens for the purposes of forum
selection, allowing a right-holder to trump the defendant-turned-
plaintiff's choice by bringing action in the appropriate forum.
It is important to note that the combined application of Articles
8 and 12 avoids the most notable problem of the defendant's forum
rule contained in article 8. The defendant's forum rule in both article
3 and article 8 makes such criterion order-dependent. Article 12 cor-
rects the main source of order-dependence, preempting most cases of
strategic "races to the courthouse" and avoiding an inefficient level of
filings for forum shopping purposes. Declaratory judgments filed in
order to establish lis pendens and to "steal the first move" from the
natural plaintiff are uselessly filed. As the commentary makes clear:
54. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1078.
55. Id. at 1079-80.
56. Id. at 1113-14. The drafters of comments to article 8 point out that both the Hague
drafters and the ALI's International Jurisdiction and Judgment Project recognize that
declaratory judgments could be strategically used by potential defendants to preempt a
plaintiff's choice of forum and to divert the case from the natural jurisdiction of the case. This
may create particularly severe problems in the field of intellectual property in which a timely
injunctive remedy is often necessary to grant effective protection of intellectual property rights.
Id. at 1113.
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To prevent this especially corrosive kind of forum shopping,
this provision [Article 12.5] follows the Hague draft's lead by al-
lowing a court seized with a coercive action-typically, an action
for intellectual property infringement-to disregard the presump-
tion in favor of the court first seized when the action in that court is
solely declaratory. Instead, the court hearing the declaratory case
must suspend its proceedings and allow the coercive action to go
forward. 7
By creating an exception solely for lis pendens (which obviously
could not effectively apply to res judicata), the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal distinguishes the case of declaratory judgments that are fol-
lowed by a filing of a substantive suit from those that are not immedi-
ately followed by such action. This leaves some residual order-
dependent effects in the criterion of jurisdiction found in article 3.
Those residual consequences of this case are not worrisome when the
natural plaintiff can preempt the first move by filing a timely suit for
substantive relief. Interestingly, would-be defendants cannot file for
a "negative declaration" prior to an actual infringement or substantial
steps toward infringement. 8 And, significantly, would-be defendants
cannot file unless they have a reasonable apprehension that they will
be sued by the natural plaintiff (copyright, patent or trademark
owner)59 Generally, this means that unless the natural plaintiff
threatens suit, the would-be defendant cannot file suit for a declara-
tion. Thus, pending a declaratory judgment action, natural plaintiffs
would generally have an opportunity to counter-file for substantive
57. Id. at 1130.
58. See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that
before a potential infringer can request a declaration of invalidity or noninfringement of a
patent it must "actually produce or be prepared to produce an allegedly infringing product");
BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that the
declaratory judgment plaintiff must have engaged in "present activity which could constitute
infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity"); Diagnostic Unit
Inmate Council v. Films Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that in a copyright case,
"plaintiff must show that it has actually published or is preparing to publish the material that is
subject to the defendant's copyright [in a manner that] places the parties in a legally adverse
position") (quoting Texas v. West Pub. Co., 882 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1989)); Starter Corp. v.
Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that to bring a declaratory judgment
action for noninfringement of a trademark the party must have either been selling a product
with the trademark or have taken specific steps evidencing a concrete intent to use the
trademark).
59. EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 811 (holding that an infringer must have a "reasonable
apprehension" of being sued by the patent holder before the infringer can file a declaratory
judgment action); Diagnostic Unit, 88 F.3d at 653 (holding that the "reasonable apprehension"
requirement for bringing a declaratory judgment action exists in copyright cases too); Starter
Corp., 84 F.3d at 595 (holding that in order for an infringer to bring a declaratory judgment
action, the trademark owner's conduct must evidence a "real and reasonable apprehension" of
liability by the infringer).
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relief, avoiding any possible res judicata, which would otherwise bring
the case outside the scope of article 12.5 and, thus, lead to order-
dependent effects in the application of article 3.60
D. Limiting the Convention to Copyright and Trademark Disputes
among TRIPs Member Countries
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal mitigates international forum
shopping for intellectual property dispute resolution in two additional
ways. First, the Convention would only be open to members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("TRIPs"), and generally
would cover the same rights covered by the intellectual property por-
tion of TRIPs.61 Although this by no means guarantees that the
TRIPs countries have the same substantive intellectual property laws,
or that those countries have similar procedures, TRIPs did require all
member countries to have certain minimum intellectual property pro-
tections. Countries are, however, free to adopt laws that provide pro-
tections greater than those minimum standards required by the treaty
and are free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the treaty. Accordingly, there is still the opportunity for differing
levels of protection and different procedures for enforcement even
among the TRIPs member nations. Limiting the Draft Convention to
TRIPS member countries will diminish, but not eliminate, interna-
tional forum shopping.
Second, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal removes patent dis-
putes from the scope of its convention. The rationale for excluding
such disputes is that the expertise required for accurate decision-
making is high and the incidence of simultaneous multinational in-
fringement is low. While it is true that the Internet has facilitated
copyright infringement to a greater extent than photocopiers and
60. It should be noted that, while theoretically interesting, this residual case of adverse
selection may well be an empty problem from a practical point of view. A res judicata for a
declaratory judgment issued under article 3 would be issued by the forum court of the "natural
plaintiff' (i.e., IP right holder). No adverse selection problem would affect that outcome, since
the natural plaintiff has incentives (and the opportunity) to establish himself in a favorable
forum jurisdiction in the first place. This is again an application of the intuition developed
above according to which forum-shopping problems are worst when they are characterized by
the combined presence of last-mover advantage problems and order-dependent choice of law
criteria.
61. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal includes sound recordings, domain name disputes,
and Paris Convention disputes. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1068.
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videocassette recorders ("VCRs") 62 -and certainly trademark in-
fringement via domain name disputes-it likewise has enabled more
patent infringement, especially in the case of patents directed to E-
commerce (business method patents) or computer software. These
patents, like copyrights, are particularly vulnerable to simultaneous
multiterritorial infringement, which the Internet facilitates.
Although there is logic to the notion that patent cases, which are
often technically complex, benefit from adjudication by courts with
expertise, many nations do not have courts of special expertise that
adjudicate these cases. The commentary to the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal suggests: "The technical incompetence issue might be
addressed by limiting the consolidation of foreign patent actions to
those States that have specialized technically competent jurisdictions,
like the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and similar
courts in other jurisdictions. ' '63
Interestingly, the court cited (the Federal Circuit) does not have
specialized and technically competent judges. Although all patent
appeals in the US are consolidated in the Federal Circuit, and ac-
cordingly simply through repetition the judges are exposed to numer-
ous patent cases, the judges appointed to the court do not necessarily
have any technical expertise or patent experience. 64 Moreover, the
Federal Circuit only hears patent cases on appeal after a lay judge or
jury has resolved them in the first instance. The suggestion of the
proposal, however, to consider limiting jurisdictions to nations like
Germany with special patent trial courts could alleviate the concerns
of many companies over incompetent decision makers. It is doubtful,
however, that nations without technically specialized trial courts (like
the US) would be willing to sign on to a treaty in which they would be
bound to enforce the judgments of courts of other countries, but
would not have the reciprocal power to adjudicate actions which
would bind those same countries. Despite great harmonization ef-
forts for substantive patent law, eliminating patent cases from the
Convention is sound in light of the differing adjudication mechanisms
of the various TRIPs countries that have evolved to resolve patent
cases.
62. Photocopiers and VCRs permit small-scale copying and distribution whereas the
Internet with its digital networking creates an environment where large-scale copying and
distribution can occur.
63. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1097.
64. At present, four of the twelve active judges have technical backgrounds (Judges




A game-theoretic analysis of forum shopping reveals how oppor-
tunities for strategic choices can influence the behavior of plaintiffs
and defendants. In the idealized benchmark case, if neither party has
the opportunity to make strategic choices about participation or fo-
rum choices, we should expect no adverse selection or moral hazard
problems. By contrast, if only one of the parties can control both the
participation and forum selection choices, then we could expect per-
vasive adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In intermediate
but more frequent scenarios, only one party has control over one of
the strategic moments of the forum-shopping problem, with some
persistence of the strategic deadweight losses present in the previous
case.
In this Article we have briefly built on the simple game-theoretic
framework to suggest that if parties are faced with a bilateral strategic
problem (i.e., if one party has control over one strategic choice and
the other party has control over the other strategic choice), the extent
of opportunistic behavior by either party-and the resulting dead-
weight losses-is likely to be minimized.
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal is sensibly designed in many re-
spects. The draft reveals full awareness of the strategic dimension of
forum shopping, helping minimize such problems in most scenarios.
As the drafters point out in their introduction, "Where a general con-
vention may be concerned with curtailing forum shopping by poten-
tial plaintiffs, an intellectual property agreement can also consider the
ability of a potential defendant to gain litigation advantages through
the choice of the location of the activities that give rise to infringe-
ment. '65 The game-theoretic framework has confirmed the drafters'
intuition by showing that, under most forum shopping scenarios, the
presence of bilateral strategic opportunities for both plaintiffs and de-
fendants is preferable to unilateral strategic problems.
Some problems related to forum shopping still affect the single-
defendant scenario, addressed in article 3 of the proposal. This Arti-
cle's habitual residence criterion raises implementation difficulties
when applied in the cyber world, with costless virtual relocation. In
such settings, the criterion is vulnerable to strategic use's failure to
adequately address situations where a defendant can unilaterally
make strategic choices about both participation choice and forum se-
65. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1066.
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lection. These problems are substantially resolved for the multiple-
defendant scenario addressed in article 10 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal. Specifically, by allowing multiple claims to be litigated in
the forum most closely related to a dispute, the proposal increases
procedural economy, and reduces any one defendant's opportunity to
manipulate the forum selection criterion of habitual residence to his
own advantage. This minimizes the ex ante problems of adverse se-
lection and the ex post problems of moral hazard. Additionally, the
rules applicable to multiple-defendant cases avoid the order-
dependence of the "defendant's forum" criterion of article 3, and thus
avoid strategic filings and race-to-the-courthouse problems. The
same holds for the provision concerning declaratory judgments. The
opportunity to file for declaratory judgments under article 8 of the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal also creates order-dependence and race-
to-the-courthouse problems. But the proposal's article 10 intelli-
gently addresses that problem by allowing an intellectual property
right holder to trump the choice of forum by a declaratory judgment
plaintiff, who races to file first. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal sen-
sibly minimizes the ex ante problems of adverse selection, the ex post
problems of moral hazard, and the strategic filing problems, and cre-
ates an enforcement scheme that maintains the innovation incentives
underlying intellectual property rights.
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